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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Cas~ 
Justin V\/icklund appeals, challenging the district court's order denying his petition 
for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. He contends that the evidence 
presented at the evidentlary hearing demonstrated that his trial counsel had provided 
ineffective assistance either by failing to properly investigate, and/or by failing to present 
to the district court mitigating evidence, in regard to a prior charged offense. 
Specifically, the evidence presented to the district court (which went unrebutted by the 
State) showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior charge was 
dismissed because Hie evidence contradicted the complaining witness's claim. The 
evidence also demonstrated that trial counsel's failure to properly investigate the prior 
charge and/or present that information to the district court prejudiced Mr. Wicklund 
because the district court relied on the similarities between that prior charge and the 
charge in the current case to justify imposing a harsher sentence in the current case. 
As such, because the preponderance of the evidence shows that ML Wicklund's trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance, the district cowi's order denying Mr. V\/icklund's 
petition for post-conviction relief was erroneous. Therefore, this Court should reverse 
that decision and remand the case so that Mr. Wicklund may be afforded the 
appropriate relief. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Co~1rs~ of Progeedings 
In his underlying criminal case, rvlr. Wicklund pied guilty to aggravated battery 
and aggravated assault (R., p.:31.) He was sentenced to a unified term of twelve 
years, with two years fixed, and a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, 
respectively. (R., p.3·1.) The sentences were ordered to run consecutively for an 
aggregate sentence of seventeen years, with four years fixed. (R., p.3·J.) The Court of 
Appeals affirmed those sentences on direct appeal in Supreme Court Docket 
No. 38697. State v. Wicklund, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 757 (Ct. App. 20·11) 
Mr. Wicklund subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.5-16.) 
In his verified petition and affidavit, ML Wicklund made several claims for relief. 
(R., pp.5-16.) One of those claims asserted that he had received ineffective assistance 
from trial counsel because trial counsel had not sufficiently investigated or presented 
information to the district court relating to a previous charge from 2009 (hereinafter, the 
2009 charge). 1 (R., p.14.) For example, trial counsel confused the facts of that case 
with those in the case at issue. (See R, p.9; Tr., Vol.4, p.21, L.16 - p.22, L.14.)2 He 
also asserted that the district court had relied on a misunderstanding of the actual 
1 That case was dismissed by the prosecutor. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3.) 
2 The transcripts in this case are contained in four separately bound and paginated 
briefs. To promote clarity, "Vol. 1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts of 
the status hearing held on May 29, 2012, and the pretrial conference held on July 3, 
2012. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the evidentiary hearing 
held on July 23, 2012. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume from the direct appeal containing 
the transcript of the change of plea hearing held on January 3, 2011. "Vol.4" will refer to 
the volume from the direct appeal containing the transcript of the sentencing hearing 
held on March 18, 2011. As Vol.3 and Vol.4 were prepared for Mr. Wicklund's direct 
appeal, a motion for the Supreme Court to take judicial notice of those transcripts from 
the direct appeal file for this appeal has been filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
2 
details of that prior charge at sentencing, improperly using it to justify a harsher 
sentence in the case challenged on post-conviction. (R, p.14.) He also moved for 
appointment of counsel, which the district court granted. (R, pp.17-21.) 
The district court subsequently filed a notice of intent to dismiss the petition, but 
did find that Mr. Wicklund had presented a meritorious claim in regard to trial counsel's 
investigation of the 2009 charge. (R, pp.40-42.) At that time, the district court took 
judicial notice of various documents and hearings from the underlying case, specifically, 
the plea agreement, the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, the change of plea hearing, the 
sentencing hearing, the judgment of conviction, the order denying Rule 35 relief, and 
the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI). (R., pp.30-31.) Transcripts of 
the change of plea and sentencing hearings were prepared for the direct appeal After 
Mr. Wicklund responded to the notice of intent to dismiss (R., pp.57-65, 67-75), the 
district court dismissed the remaining claims from the petition and set an evidentiary 
hearing for the claim regarding the 2009 charge. (R., pp.90-91.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Wicklund presented testimony from the attorney 
who had represented him in regard to the 2009 charge. (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, L.5 - p.19, 
L.20.) That attorney testified that his investigation of the 2009 charge revealed several 
witnesses who contradicted the complaining witness's version of events. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.16, Ls.10-11.) He also testified that the medical records also did not support her 
story. (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, Ls.13-16.) Furthermore, that attorney testified that he had 
presented this information to the prosecutor, and the impression he got from the 
prosecutor was that the complaining witness was not very credible. (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, 
Ls.4-10.) That attorney testified "once I showed [the prosecutor], I think, affidavits and 
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statements from witnesses, they moved to dismiss." (Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.4-6.) Based 
on his observations, that attorney believed the State had dismissed the charge because 
there was no evidence to support the complaining witness's version of events. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.2-6). 
That attorney also testified that "[if the client] had previously been charged with 
rape and it [was] dismissed and this is a current rape case, I'd want to know the facts 
from that [prior] one to see if they help or hurt, and if they help, you'd want to make the 
Court aware of it." (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.1.) The attorney also explained that, 
based on the facts of these cases, it was a breach of trial counsel's duty to his client to 
not investigate that prior offense or present the details about that case to the district 
court (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.19; Tr., Vol.2, p.15, Ls.2--6.) 
Mr. Wicklund also testified at that hearing, asserting that the district court had 
relied on the erroneous impression of the facts of the 2009 case to impose a harsher 
sentence on him in the challenged case. (Tr., VoL2, p.24, Ls.4-25.) The transcript of 
the sentencing hearing indicates that the district court explicitly relied on the affidavit 
filed in support of the arrest warrant in aggravation when it sentenced Mr. Wicklund: 
I reviewed the affidavit [in support of complaint and warrant for arrest 
(Petitioner's Exhibit 2)] from Officer Rudner filed April 16, 2009. 
I recognize that case was dismissed and so it is with due caution that 
I review the facts set forth in that affidavit, but I take away from the 
affidavit with my due caution a concern that it was a similar type of 
situation. It was alleged rough sex, if you will, if not rape, and in particular 
on page four of that affidavit Mr. Wicklund is quoted or indicated as 
advising the officer that he has a history of violence and was taking 
medications for his numerous anger management issues .... 
There is also a reference to Mr. Wicklund making statements that 
he used a condom and so forth, so the fact that sex did occur is certainly 
referenced in the affidavit and I give weight to that, as well as to the 
factors set forth that the victim in that circumstance, Mary Machelle 
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Barnes, was taken into surgery .... To me those facts, not withstanding 
due caution, are established. 
The facts here I find are similar. . . . The situation was a violent 
one. It was one again involving sex .... The nature of the harm and the 
violence done is a significant consideration, the potential for future risk I 
find is significant, and the potential for societal harm where there have 
been incidents involving similar behavior with two independent people is 
also elevated. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.23, L.8 - p.26, L.7.) The State did not call any witness of its own, nor did it 
offer any other evidence to contradict the testimony given by the attorney who handled 
the 2009 charge. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) 
The district court ultimately denied Mr. \/Vicklund's claim, reasoning: 
[Trial counsel] did not testify at this evidentiary hearing and therefore what 
[he] 'knew' or 'didn't know' is entirely speculative. Further, what [he] 'did' 
or 'didn't do' to investigate the circumstances of the 2009 case is likewise 
purely speculative. [Mr.] Wicklund was given an opportunity to develop 
the record in these regards and has failed to do so. This factor Is critical in 
this case because [Mr.] Wicklund contends that [trial counsel) should have 
done something different at sentencing to provide effective assistance of 
counsel. The record before this Court does not support [Mr.] Wicklund's 
assertion, 
(R., pp.105-06.) Mr. Wicklund filed a timely notice of appeal from that decision. 
(R., pp.113-14.) He also filed a prose motion for reconsideration, which the district 




district court when it denied Mr. Wicklund's petition for 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wicklund's Petition For 
~ -~----
Post-Conviction Relief 
The preponderance of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing 
demonstrates that Mr. Wicklund's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel, either by failing to investigate the reasons behind the dismissal of the 2009 
charge, or by failing to present that evidence to the district court The preponderance of 
the evidence also demonstrates that Mr. Wicklund was prejudiced by that unreasonable 
performance because the district court relied significantly on a misunderstanding of the 
facts from the 2009 case, explicitly using that case as an aggravating factor when it 
imposed Mr. Wicklund's sentence. Therefore, the district court erred by denying 
Mr. Wicklund's petition for post-conviction relief. This Court should reverse that 
decision and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when 
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700 (1999) (citing LR.C.P. 52(a)); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct 
App.1990). When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers 
to the district court's factual findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of the relevant law to those facts. Id. (citing Young v. State, 115 
Idaho 52, 54 (Ct. App.1988)). At a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the petitioner 
must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548, 560 (2008); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2004). "A 'preponderance of 
the evidence' is evidence that, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more 
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convincing force and from which results a greater probability of truth." Harris v 
Electrical Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 3 
To a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show 
that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that \Nas prejudiced as a result of that unreasonable performance. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, (1984); v. State, ·143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006). 
Mr. V\/icklund testified that his attorney should have investigated the 2009 case to know 
why that case had been dismissed (as Mr. Wicklund testified he did not have that 
information), or should have presented it with his objection to the inclusion of Officer 
Rudner's affidavit in the PSI, fighting harder to 
from the PSI (Tr., VoL2, p.20, L.24 p. L. 
the erroneous information stricken 
Mr. Wicklund also testified that, as a 
result of trial counsel's failure to do so, the district court was left with an erroneous 
impression of the 2009 case, upon which it relied in imposing a harsher sentence upon 
him. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.4-25.) 
Counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable, prompt, and thorough investigation 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998). To show that counsel has conducted an 
unreasonable investigation, the petitioner needs to show what information the 
reasonable investigation would have revealed. Id. The courts are to consider not only 
the evidence known to counsel, but also whether that "known evidence would lead a 
reasonable attorney to investigate further:' Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 
(Ct. App. 2006). "Moreover, counsel is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and 
review material that the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence." Id. 
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Additionally, part of counsel's job at sentencing is to present mitigating evidence 
to the district court. See, e.g., Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App. 2007) 
("[Counsel's] neglect to pursue the [mitigating evidence] raises a material question 
regarding the vi~Jor and competence of his counsel's representatiort"); State 
v. Richman, 138 Idaho 190, 192-93 (Ct. App. 2002); Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 
125-26 (Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Ivey, 123 Idaho 74, 77 (1992) (holding that 
where defense counsel "prepared to present mitigating evidence, yet [was] frustrated in 
its fruition, appellant effectively was denied assistance of counsel"). "A decision not to 
investigate or present mitigating evidence is assessed for reasonableness, giving 
deference to counsel's judgment." Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 495 (Ct. App. 2008). 
If a petitioner fails to identify what the mitigating evidence actually was or how it "might 
have changed the outcome of these proceedings," he fails to prove a claim of 
ineffectiveness in this regard. State v. vVood, 132 Idaho 88, 97 (1998); Knutsen, 144 
Idaho at 443. 
Mr. Wicklund identified the evidence which counsel should have investigated 
and/or presented as mitigation to the district court through the testimony of his attorney 
from the prior case. That attorney testified that "The evidence didn't support [the 
complaining witness's] story, so the State -- once I showed them, I think, affidavits and 
statements from witnesses, they moved to dismiss." (Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.3-6.) He 
explained, "[w]e had witnesses who contradicted everything she claimed and my 
recollection was she came across as mentally unstable for the most part." (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.16, Ls.10-13.) That attorney also testified that his impression from conversations with 
the prosecutor was that the prosecutor believed the complaining witness was not 
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credible. (Tr., Vol.2, p.1 Ls.4-10.) Additionally, that attorney testified that "[if the 
client] had previously been charged with and it [was] dismissed and this is a 
current I'd want know the from that [prior] one to see if they or 
hurt, and if they help, you'd want to make the Court aware of it" (Tr., VoL2, p.14, 
p.1 L.1.) He explained that, based on the of it was a breach trial 
counsel's duty to his client (i.e., was objectively unreasonable) to not investigate that 
prior offense or to not present the details about that case to the district court at the 
sentencing hearing in this case. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L 19; Tr., VoL2, p.15, Ls.2-6.) The 
State did not offer any evidence to contradict that attorney's impressions or challenge 
his conclusions about unreasonableness trial counsel's investigation. 
generally Tr., Vol.2.) Therefore, through that attorney's uncontradicted testimony, 
Mr. Wicklund proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his attorney's 
performance in failing to investigate the prior charge and/or failing to present it the 
district court was objectively unreasonable, satisfying the first prong of the Strickland 
analysis. 
The district court held that, because it was not clear from the evidence presented 
whether or not trial counsel knew about this information, Mr. Wicklund had failed to 
prove his claim. (R., pp.105-07 .) That conclusion is erroneous because in either 
case, trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable. If trial counsel did not 
know about the reasons behind the dismissal of the 2009 case, he failed to conduct a 
reasonable investigation of material that the prosecution will probably rely on.3 
See Murphy, 143 Idaho at 146. Therefore, that is something that trial counsel "was 
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bound" to reasonably investigate. See id Alternatively, if trial counsel knew about 
the reasons behind the dismissal of the 2009 case, he failed to present that mitigating 
evidence to the district court, which constitutes objectively unreasonable performance. 
See, e,g., Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443. Therefore, whether or not trial counsel knew 
about U1is information is irrelevant - in either case, a preponderance of the evidence 
demonstrates that his performance was objectively unreasonable. 
The preponderance of the evidence also shows the greater probability that trial 
counsel's unreasonable performance prejudiced Mr. Wicklund. See Harris, 141 Idaho 
at 3. Mr. Wicklund testified that the district court was able to rely on the erroneous 
impression of the 2009 case, specifically the allegations supporting the initial warrant for 
arrest without the critical explanation that the evidence did not support those assertions, 
to impose a harsher sentence on Mr. Wicklund. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.4-25.) The record 
bears out that claim. The district court took judicial notice of the sentencing hearing 
from the underlying case. (R., pp.30-31.) The transcript of that hearing reveals that the 
district court explicitly relied on the similarity of the allegations from the 2009 case, 
contained in Officer Rudner's affidavit in support of a warrant for arrest (Petitioner's 
Exhibit 2), in its imposition of sentence in the case challenged in post-conviction: 
I reviewed the affidavit from Officer Rudner filed April 16, 2009. 
recognize that case was dismissed and so it is with due caution that I 
review the facts set forth in that affidavit, but I take away from the affidavit 
with my due caution a concern that it was a similar type of situation. It 
was alleged rough sex, if you will, if not rape, and in particular on page 
four of that affidavit Mr. Wicklund is quoted or indicated as advising the 
officer that he has a history of violence and was taking medications for his 
numerous anger management issues . ... 
3 The prosecution is very likely to rely on a defendant's prior criminal history in its 
sentencing argument, particularly if there are similar charges in that criminal history. 
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There is also a reference to Mr. Wicklund making statements that 
he used a condom and so forth, so the fact that sex did occur is certainly 
referenced in the affidavit and I give weight to that, as well as to the 
factors set forth that the victim in that circumstance, Mary Machelle 
Barnes, was taken into surgery . . . To me those facts, not withstanding 
due caution, are established. 
The facts here I find are similar. . . The situation was a violent 
one. It was one again involving sex. . . The nature of the harm and the 
violence done is a significant consideration, the potential for future risk I 
find is significant, and the potential for societal harm where there have 
been incidents involving similar behavior with two independent 
people is also elevated. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.23, L.8 - p.26, L7 (emphasis added).) In fact, the district court's 
discussion of the 2009 charge constituted nearly half its total comments before 
imposing sentence. ( Compare Tr., Vol.4, p 22, L.18 - p.26, L.23 (the entirety of the 
district court's comments before imposing sentence); with Tr., Vol.4, p.23, L.8 p.26, L.7 
(the district court's comments relating to the 2009 charge).) As such, the impact of the 
district court's misconception regarding the underlying charge clearly impacted its 
consideration of the sentencing factors in a manner detrimental to Mr. Wicklund. 
(See, e.g., Tr., VoL4, p.26, LsA-7.) Therefore, a preponderance of the evidence reveals 
that Mr. Wicklund was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to investigate the details 
surrounding the dismissal of the 2009 charge and/or trial counsel's failure to present 
that information to the district court, thereby satisfying the second prong of the 
Strickland analysis. 
A preponderance of the evidence presented (particularly since no evidence was 
presented in contradiction by the State) shows that there is greater probability that 
Mr. Wicklund received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's objectively 
unreasonable failure to investigate the details behind the dismissal of the 2009 charge 
and/or the unreasonable failure to present that evidence to the district court, either or 
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both of which resulted in prejudice to Mr. VVicklund when the district court relied 
significantly on a misunderstanding of that case to impose a harsher on 
Mr. Wicklund. Therefore, the district court 
post-conviction relief. 
in denying Mr. VVicklund's petition 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wicklund respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief and remand for further ings. 
DATED this 1 day of May, 201 
BRIAN R DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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